5. Conclusion: Bridges to Nowhere

A single weather event, Hurricane Katrina, has brought about the greatest population dislocation in the United States since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Katrina was not the strongest hurricane ever to hit the Gulf Coast, but it was perhaps the most destructive ever due to its extraordinary storm surge on the one hand, and due to human failures on the other. These failures are many and profound: the inadequacy of levees, the inadequacy of the evacuation plan, the inadequacy of the governmental response and a social environment characterized by widespread poverty, racial inequities and a history of racial discrimination. Without these failures, Hurricane Katrina, whose effect was compounded in mostly rural areas by Hurricane Rita, might have had an impact much more in keeping with most other hurricanes. Instead, Katrina's impact will be permanent and irreversible for many families and communities. The cleanup and reconstruction effort alone will likely take no less than a decade to accomplish, but the speed of that effort will also be determined by whether the American people step forward and exert sufficient pressure on their government to speed up the relief and reconstruction effort, or whether that effort is also shaped by human failure and a lack of compassion. President Bush has made a lot of easy promises, but has failed to live up to his words.

As our tour bus for the Congressional Delegation made up of Select Committee Members, guest Members and their staff drove through the devastated Lower Ninth Ward of New Orleans, not far from downtown, one could still get a sense of the charm. Aside from the roads having been cleared, little had changed in four and a half months since a twenty foot wall of water was unleashed upon the is community of lower-income, mostly African-American residents. As we passed by heaps of debris, we were reminded that there were likely to be found more dead bodies (as indeed several have been even since our visit), it was possible to imagine the lifestyle of the residents of these cozy square wood houses.

Fourteen per cent of residents in the Lower Ninth were senior citizens. Another fourteen percent were handicapped. A full sixty percent owned their own homes, ranking the home ownership rate in this community among the highest in the country. At the same time, only forty per cent of residents were literate. These astonishing figures tell a tale of a community that was industrious, frugal and ill-served by the educational system. But most of all, you could tell just by looking that in spite of the fact that their homes were small, the people who lived here were proud of their community, and proud to contribute their part to the culture of New Orleans.

Another dramatic fact is that few of these residents left New Orleans very often. But now they are scattered to the four winds and 44 states, and of all the residents of New Orleans they face the longest odds of ever returning to their homes, most of which are beyond repair, let alone ever receiving compensation for the loss of their property. Numbers and dollar figures cannot begin to calculate the loss experienced by, say, a senior in her 80s who had rarely ever set foot outside New Orleans, but who now faces the challenge of starting a new life all over again in a strange community far away, separated from family and friends.

Hurricane Katrina, which struck the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama on August 29, 2005, was the first event to be declared an "Incident of National Significance" by the Secretary of Homeland Security, as empowered to do so under the NRP. The first priority listed in the

event of an Incident of National Significance is "to save lives and protect the health and safety of the public, resources and recovery workers."

A mandatory evacuation was declared for the City of New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Yet more than 100,000 residents of New Orleans simply lacked the means to evacuate upon demand. There are many reasons why. The elderly, the disabled and the infirm required special assistance. Most self-supporting residents were low income earners and did not have their own means of transport to get out. Before the Hurricane Pam exercise in 2004, this issue seriously addressed, but funds for hurricane disaster planning were cut by the DHS.

For the low income, mostly black residents of Orleans Parish who had not heeded or could not heed evacuation calls, the order to evacuate was effectively meaningless. How would our 82 year-old grandmother with no care, living on a fixed income, and whose only family was based in the area about to be hit, get up and relocate out of the city. For starters, how would she pay for the hotel bills? For as many as five days after Hurricane Katrina, many of the bridges of New Orleans became bridges to nowhere, most with floodwaters on both ends. Thousands of survivors spent days stranded on a bridge, hopeful and expectant that one of the many helicopters flying overhead would stop and rescue them from the toxic floodwaters and the searing hot sun. Some black survivors report helicopters teasing them at the prospect of rescue and then leaving them and moving on to white neighborhoods. The conditions at the Convention Center, the Superdome, the I-10 / Causeway Cloverleaf resembled concentration camps—days of internment without adequate food, water or sanitation, and a growing sense of hopelessness. Yet all this wasn't all just about poor coordination. The Gretna Police *turned back* survivors seeking a way out by crossing the Crescent City Connection bridge, and subsequently confiscated their food and water—bridge to nowhere.

What we are left with is a spectacular failure of government. Prior to the flooding of New Orleans, Grover Norquist, President of Americans for Tax Reform and a close associated of indicted lobbyist Jack Abramoff, has publicly stated the following: "I don't want to abolish government. I simply want to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub." It seems he got his wish, at least for the people of New Orleans. Hurricane Katrina should and undoubtedly will force us to reexamine prevalent notions of the market fundamentalists, who are ready and willing to fund any wars the government takes on, but who loathe paying for social programs or public infrastructure. It was under-funding that contributed to the flooding of New Orleans, and to the delinquent response. It may be underfunding that cripples the ability of tens of thousands of residents to return home and rebuild their lives.

Americans are generous when it comes to disaster. The \$3 billion that has been raised by private entities for the relief effort eclipses the \$2.2 raised for victims of 9/11. "But charity is episodic and driven by disaster. What is needed are structures of justice that perpetuate the goodwill intended in charity." 149

The Gulf Coast provides America with a significant share of its energy supplies. This should be kept in mind as Congress and the White House decide how much relief and reconstruction monies are to be given, and in what form. Making a strong investment may pay greater

dividends later. We can choose to leave New Orleans to the Donald Trumps and Prince Charles's of the world, who are already busy buying up property and planning their casinos and condominiums for the rich. In doing so we may be depriving tens of thousands of working people of their right of return, of their voting rights, of their property rights and yes, of their civil rights.

We can also choose to go half-way and assist only enough to restore things to the way they were before Katrina. But many working class survivors don't want to go back to how it was before. They see Katrina as an opportunity to fix what was broken. They dream of a New Orleans with its racial diversity restored, free of grinding poverty and crowded prisons, with strong levees and comprehensive evacuation plans for future hurricanes. The Federal government should seek creative ways to assist in such a noble endeavor.

Summary of Recommendations:

- When the National Response Plan and/or other disaster preparedness plans are revised, they need to be updated to anticipate looting as a highly probable and often rational response to scarcity by individuals in an emergency. Rights of property must not supersede the right to food, water and medicine, i.e. the right to survive, especially not during a declared emergency.
- FEMA or any agency that replaces it must be directed to produce impact and implementation policy studies aimed at producing emergency preparedness and response policies that address the particular needs of minority communities.
- Congress should pass legislation to set procedures for protecting the civil liberties of
 minorities during an emergency situation. Armed forces and police should be on notice
 that individual acts of blatant discrimination or abuse of minorities will result in serious
 punishments, and systemic abuse will result in loss of financial support. Private relief
 organizations with discriminatory relief practices should be subject to review and
 possible loss of contracts.
- Recommendation: Future emergency preparedness planning must include the provision
 of transportation for the elderly, the infirm and those without their own means of
 locomotion, as well as the placing of Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) as near as is
 feasible, to enable these evacuees to return to their homes as quickly and easily as
 possible.
- Congress should pass legislation to ban political patronage within Federal agencies; specifically within FEMA and DHS.
- Recommendation: The National Response Plan should either be overhauled or scrapped. A new plan should be developed that includes: 1) unambiguous command structures for military responders; 2) crystal clear clarification regarding the integration of the work of state and federal armed forces during an emergency to maximize the ability to deploy military assets in a pro-active manner; 3) pre-set standard operating procedures for non-military agencies operating in a crisis detailing what operations they can and should initiate without waiting for marching orders from a higher authority; 4) an integrated communications plan that puts all responders on the same page from the get-go, using Interoperable Communications technology.
- Recommendation: The National Response Plan is color blind, and any future such
 national emergency response plans must include sensitivity training for both military and
 non-military responders so that responders are aware in advance of the specific needs and
 leadership patterns in communities of color.
- Recommendation: Emergency response agencies like FEMA should offer diversity training to their employees, and establish direct working relationships with leadership

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figures in minority communities living in disaster prone areas such as flood planes so that those relationships are forged and ready to call upon prior to the emergency.

- Congress should re-establish FEMA as an independent Federal agency, removing it from DHS; but give housing oversight back to HUD.
- Take international politics out of disaster relief efforts by establishing a policy that no legitimate offers of foreign assistance will be refused.
- Future hurricane response plans should include evacuations for prisons susceptible to flooding.
- Congress should direct the Government Accountability office to investigate:
 - 1) the degree to which confusion over roles, responsibilities and powers contributed to the tragic and unnecessary delay in dispatching Federal forces to the incident site; and
 - 2) the Bush administration's claims that the Commander-in-Chief needs more power than the Constitution envisions or allows.
- Recommendation: The Constitutional principle and practice of separating military and
 police functions has become a cornerstone of our democracy. Congress should re-affirm
 the Posse Comitatus Act in light of proposals to amend or overturn it being made by our
 President.
- Congress should revive the Superfund program, which taxes polluters to pay for the environmental cleanup they are responsible for creating in the first place.
- Congress must pass legislation directing the Environmental Protection Agency to
 establish a comprehensive assessment and protection plan for the citizens of the Gulf
 Coast to protect the public from environmental contaminants and infectious materials that
 pose a threat to public health and safety in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
- The Federal government should establish a commission to work with scientists, engineers
 and state and local governments to explore the feasibility of the "Coast 2050" plan to
 restore the coastal wetlands.

SOURCE NOTES

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Cover Art: by Ricardo Levins Morales, distributed by the Northland Poster Collective, who offered the Hurricane Katrina Poster and raise funds for the relief efforts. For More Information: Northland Poster: 1-800-627-3082; [http://www.northlandposter.com] (accessed February 6, 2006); Southern Partners Fund: [http://www.spfund.org] (accessed February 6, 2006).

On July 22, 2005, on the anniversary of the release of the *9/11 Commission Report*, Rep. Cynthia McKinney hosted a Congressional Briefing entitled "The 9/11 Commission Report One Year Later: Did the Commission Get it Right?" at which over 30 independent experts discussed the omissions, errors and false premises of the Report.

David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States made this observation at a press conference held jointly with Select Committee Chairman Tom Davis on Wednesday, February 1st, 2006.

- 3 "....for those even slightly familiar with the current intelligence reform proposals, there is a more than vague sense, to use Yogi Berra's immortal phrase, 'Deja vu all over again.' There has been a failure. Pearl Harbor. The unpredicted Soviet development of the Atomic Bomb, the Chinese Communist victory in 1949. Remember who lost China. The equally unpredicted North Korean invasion in 1950. The Bay of Pigs failure. Vietnam. The overthrow of the Shah in 1978. Samosa and Nicaragua a year later, not only unpredicted, but confidently declared by our intelligence estimates as impossible, or a scandal, and Iran-Contra comes to mind inevitably here, and some others in the 1970s. What happens next? A commission will be appointed, usually by the Executive, but post-Vietnam, often by the Congress. You will recall the Hoover Commission in the 1950s, the Church and Pike Commissions of the 1970s, and the Iran-Contra Joint Congressional Committee in the 1980s. Often forgotten are the Senate hearings of 1992, which tried to learn how we were so unprepared for Iraq's evasion of Kuwait, and led among other things to the late Senator Moynihan's very serious proposal for doing away with the CIA altogether, and Senator Arlen Spector's repeated and now accepted idea that the post of National Director of Intelligence and Director of the CIA be separated. The Committee, talking of this generic committee here, will labor long and hard and recommend inevitably that the agencies concerned coordinate their activities better and share their information" -- David MacMichael, former CIA officer, speaking at the Congressional Briefing "The 9/11 Commission Report One Year Later: Did the Commission Get it Right?", July 22, 2005. While this quote concerns intelligence form, the conclusions of the Select Committee Report do tend to fit the pattern described.
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- ¹²¹ Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, December 2004, p. 9.
- ¹²² Letter from Cathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of Louisiana to President George W. Bush, September 3, 2005.
- ¹²³ Roig-Franzia, Manuel and Spencer Hsu "Many Evacuated, but Thousands Still Waiting: White House Shifts Blame to State and Local Officials," *Washington Post*, September 4, 2005; A01. The report adds: "A senior administration official said that Bush has clear legal authority to federalize National Guard units to quell civil disturbances under the Insurrection Act and will continue to try to unify the chains of command that are split among the president, the Louisiana governor and the New Orleans mayor."
- 124 Cf. Wayne, Leslie and Glen Justice, "FEMA Leader Under Clinton Makes it Pay," New York Times, October 10, 2005.
- 125 Roig-Franza and Hse, op. cit.
- ¹²⁶ Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, December 2004, p. 7.
- 127 WWLTV, Aug 31, 2005.
- ¹²⁸ Ex Parte Milligan 71 US 2 1866.
- 129 Roig-Franza and Hse, op. cit.
- 130 Roig-Franza and Hse, ibid.
- Ritt Goldstein, Sydney Australia Morning Herald, March, 2003; United States Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2,
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- ¹³³ Washington Monthly, "Which of these four is not like the other?" September 11, 2005; and Reynolds, Diana, "The Rise of the National Security State: FEMA and the NSC, Public Eye," Covert Action Information Bulletin, #33, Winter 1990.
- ¹³⁴ New York Times, November 18, 1991, "Continuity of Government planning"; Washington Post, October 2001, "Shadow Government Operating in Secret"; The Brookings Institute and the Heritage Foundation have published numerous studies on the post-attack use of COG.
- ¹³⁵ Remarks by Rep. Cynthia McKinney regarding her introduction of House Concurrent Resolution 274 in 2005 to reaffirm Congressional support for Posse Comitatus. Such a resolution passed the House in 2003.
- ¹³⁶ ABC News, "Sludge Contains High Content of Fecal Bacteria," September 16, 2005. "The analysis also found astonishing levels of bacteria. A measuring unit of normal soil has about 500 units of bacteria, while the sludge has 13.5 million. Samples of normal soil generally contain less than 200 units of fecal bacteria, but the sludge has 310,000." Cf. also: Palmer, Jioni J., "National Guard entrenched in muck on disaster's front lines," Newsday, September 19, 2005.

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¹⁴¹ Community Forum, "Who is Cleaning up After Katrina?" held in New Orleans on January 19, 2006.

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- 144 Graham, George, "Mysterious Illness Could Have Katrina Ties," Ruston Daily Leader, (Ruston, LA), January 3,
- ¹⁴⁵ Environmental Defense Fund, "After Hurricane Katrina, Restoring Wetlands for Protection," September 8, 2005.
- ¹⁴⁶ Jackson, Patrick, "Lake faces aftermath of city catastrophe," BBC News, September 8, 2005.
- 147 "Coast 2050," cf. the online report at: [http://www.coast2050.gov/] (accessed February 5, 2006).
- ¹⁴⁸ Hsu, Spencer S., "Post-Katrina Promises Largely Unfulfilled," Washington Post, January 28, 2006.
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¹⁵⁰ Authors Kenneth R. Foster and Robert Giegengack have suggested that New Orleans should not be rebuilt where it sits below sea level, that the risk is too great for a repeat of Katrina or worse. Part of their skepticism, however, is based on their prediction that "the flood control system will be patched up in an ad hoc manner, [and] insufficient funds will be made available to bring the entire system up to the design goal of withstanding a Category 3 hurricane—much less the vastly greater funds needed to provide reliable protection against more intense storms." They also note that the goal of build levees to protect against a level 5 hurricane is not, "strictly speaking, a welldefined goal because a Category 5 hurricane has no defined upper limit to its wind speed and storm surge." -Foster and Giegengack, "Planning for a City on the Brink," Chapter 5 in On Risk and Disaster: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina, Ronald J. Daniels, et. al., eds., Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 41-58.

¹³⁷ Cf. CNN.com, "Storms turn everyday items to toxic trash," October 5, 2005.

¹³⁸ Testimony of Marty J. Bahamonde, office of Public Affairs, Federal Emergency Management Agency before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Thursday, October 20, 2005.

^{139 &}quot;Reinhabiting homes with visible oil contamination is not recommended because of the potential for skin exposure to oil substances. If people choose to reenter the affected area before remediation, they should take precautions to avoid contact with oil substances. Sensitive individuals, including children and people with recently healed or open wounds, should avoid all exposure to oil substances." —Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Health Consultation: Murphy Oil Spill," November 8, 2005; cf. also: Llanos, Miguel, "Residents at oil spill site told not to move back: Some in Katrina disaster area have, but EPA has 'serious concerns'," MSNBC.com, November 10, 2005; online at: [http://www.msnbc.com.msn.com/id/9994305] (accessed November 10, 2005). ¹⁴⁰ Center for Progressive Reform, "An Unnatural Disaster: The Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina Executive Summary", September 2005, p. 5.

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